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COM(2004) 261 final: WHY?
The Management of Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Internal Market
“A lack of common rules regarding the governance of collecting 
societies may be potentially detrimental to both users and 
rightholders, as it may expose them through different conditions 
applying in various Member States, as well as to a lack of 
transparency and legal certainty. The more divergence exists on 
such rules, the more difficult it is in principle to license across 
borders and to establish licensing for the territory of several or all 
Member States”
(a) Community wide licensing; 
(b) DRM (levy tariffs; interoperability); 
(c) Individual licensing (© contracts);
(d) Governance
COM(2004) 261 final: WHY?
Big v small
For mechanicals, CEL since 1987 (Polygram STEMRA)
“Those who join a collective system cannot then undermine it by 
demanding different arrangements where the transaction cost is low”
(STIM 1997, cited in Wallis et al. 1999)
Cannes Agreement (major mechanicals reduced from 8% to 6%)
Autocratic, impenetrable, inefficient
U2; pop v classical (UK Monopolies & Mergers Commission: 
Performing Rights; 1996; HMSO Cm 3147)
Competition issues
GEMA decisions of 1971/1972 (groups of rights can be self-
administered)
Simulcasting Agreement (ifpi & European broadcasters): choice of 
society for licence for simulaneous transmission by radio/TV of 
sound recordings; approved by EC 2002
Santiago Agreement (2001; EC competition intervention 2004)
19th century invention
Ernest Bourget (Ambassadeurs 1847); 
SACEM: 1851; 1903 GDT (Strauss); 
1914 PRS (Boosey)
Proliferation:
Music (performing rights, mechanicals, phonograms, 
performers)
Word; Newspapers; Music editions; Visual arts; Photo; 
Film; Video; Satellite/cable transmission
GEMA annual turnover: near €1bn
Institutions of a kind
(A) two-fold monopoly
– user perspective: only one supplier of licences
– right holder perspective: only one provider of 
rights administration
(B) Within CS, complex mix of interests
– authors & publishers
– socio-cultural features
– contested distribution: who gets what?
– self-organising bureaucracy
Three views
• Response to market failure
– Collecting Societies ‘solely exist for the benefit of right 
owners and users’
– Royalty processing centre (cf. VISA)
• Reward for creators
– ‘Schutzorganisation für den schöpferischen
Menschen’ (GEMA)
– Union roots?
• Regulatory mechanism
– Policy goal???
(1) Response to market failure
Solution to transaction cost problem creates monopolies
– User
– Right owner
→ No market mechanism for setting licensing tariffs
Regulation via competition law
– no cultural deductions
– no distribution variation for genres
– licensing tribunal (cf. BT broad band tariffs)
– competition between collecting societies?
Incoherence of approach
• differentials music, word, games
• relationship publishers and authors
• cross-subsidy big-small
WIPO Reader
• Under a publishing contract signed with an author, the publisher is 
authorised to reproduce the work and to sell copies to the public. He 
will also try to have riders written into the contract granting him the 
rights of performance and broadcasting, in the hope that this “second 
serving” of rights will add to his income.
• If music publishers are kept out of the collective management of rights 
of performance and broadcasting, the collective management 
organization will not have access to the music publishing rights, which 
are in the nature of “extras” in the hands of publishers. This makes for 
serious gaps in the collective management, because published works 
have a vastly greater audience than handwritten works. Experience has 
shown that collective management without the incorporation of 
publishers quickly stagnates and loses its meaning. All the copyright 
societies of Europe and North America have therefore incorporated 
publishers who – as members or clients – assign all these “extra” rights 
to their collective management administration
(2) Author reward
Often based on some form of author 
fundamentalism:
“Schützen, was man schützen kann. Vergüten, was man 
nicht schützen kann.” (Zypries)
“fair dealing” not an exception but a defence
Authors’ choice:
– Maximise income; force high tariffs on easy targets 
(GEMA: “aus der letzten Ritze pressen”)
– Authors must eventually understand that their 
interests are more aligned with citizens/users than 
commercial intermediaries
(3) Regulatory mechanism
Danger: we ask collecting societies to remedy 
failures of the © regime (cf. “alternative 
compensation system”)
• Articulate purpose
• Users on board
Members free to withdraw repertoire (but: ‘creative 
commons’ v ‘cherry picking’)?
Competition between societies?
Discriminate in favour of local repertoire?
Discriminate in favour of life music?
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